Dulles CBP Agriculture Specialists Intercept 110 Pounds of Prohibited Cow Skins and Dried Beef in Passenger Baggage
Release Date: September 27, 2021
Agriculture specialists also discovered wood bark, leaves and insects
STERLING, Virginia – Threats to our nation’s agricultural industries can take many forms. From the deliberate act of agro-terrorism, to the hitchhiking of invasive insect species, to the unintended act posed by travelers who pack prohibited cultural food products in their baggage, the introduction of invasive insects, or plant and animal diseases can severely impact our nation’s economic security.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection agriculture specialists at Washington Dulles International Airport must remain steadfast at intercepting all potential threats, such as the recent discovery of a combined 110 pounds of cow skins and dried beef in baggage from Nigeria and Cameroon, respectively.
According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), cow skins and dried beef potentially carry highly contagious or deadly animal diseases, such as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Foot and Mouth Disease, that could threaten our nation’s cattle and livestock industries. That is why it remains prohibited to import unpermitted meat products from continents that have experienced animal disease.
The Nigerian and Cameroon travelers arrived at Dulles Airport on September 7 on a flight from Ethiopia and were separately referred to secondary baggage examinations.
The passenger from Nigeria initially declared that she possessed no agriculture products, but when given another opportunity amended her declaration to include cow skins. During her baggage exam, CBP agriculture specialists discovered 66 pounds of cow skins and a little more than two pounds of wood bark. A closer inspection of the wood bark revealed a live insect larva.
The passenger from Cameroon declared that he was only carrying dried eru, a green leafy African vegetable; however, an x-ray detected anomalies in his baggage. Agriculture specialists inspected his baggage and discovered 44 pounds of dried beef, more than four pounds of wood bark, and soursop leaves, a plant alleged to have healing properties in Africa. Additionally, agriculture specialists discovered numerous insects and potential plant disease.
CBP submitted the insect specimens and plant disease to an entomologist and a pathologist, respectively, from the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) for identification. That final identification is pending.
CBP seized the prohibited products and released both travelers, who were destined to addresses in Maryland. CBP incinerated the prohibited animal products.
“These interceptions illustrate the very real threat that Customs and Border Protection agriculture specialists combat every day in order to protect our nation’s natural resources and economic security, and they meet that challenge with extraordinary commitment and vigilance,” said John Jurgutis, Acting Area Port Director for the Area Port of Washington, D.C.
CBP agriculture specialists have extensive training and experience in the biological sciences and agricultural inspection, inspect tens of thousands of international air passengers, and air and sea cargoes nationally being imported to the United States.
During a typical day last year, CBP agriculture specialists across the nation seized 3,091 prohibited plant, meat, animal byproducts, and soil, and intercepted 250 insect pests at U.S. ports of entry. Learn more about what CBP accomplished during “A Typical Day” in 2020.
CBP's border security mission is led at ports of entry by CBP officers from the Office of Field Operations. CBP officers screen international travelers and cargo and search for illicit narcotics, unreported currency, weapons, counterfeit consumer goods, prohibited agriculture, and other illicit products that could potentially harm the American public, U.S. businesses, and our nation’s safety and economic vitality.
Please visit CBP Ports of Entry to learn more about how CBP’s Office of Field Operations secures our nation’s borders. Learn more about CBP at www.CBP.gov.
Follow the Director of CBP’s Baltimore Field Office on Twitter at @DFOBaltimore and on Instagram at @dfobaltimore for breaking news, current events, human interest stories and photos.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection is the unified border agency within the Department of Homeland Security charged with the management, control and protection of our nation's borders at and between official ports of entry. CBP is charged with securing the borders of the United States while enforcing hundreds of laws and facilitating lawful trade and travel.
Last modified: September 27, 2021
Tags: Agriculture Know Before You Visit Travel Office of Field Operations Port Security
''U.S. Customs and Border Protection agriculture specialists at Washington Dulles International Airport must remain steadfast at intercepting all potential threats, such as the recent discovery of a combined 110 pounds of cow skins and dried beef in baggage from Nigeria and Cameroon, respectively.''
''According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), cow skins and dried beef potentially carry highly contagious or deadly animal diseases, such as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Foot and Mouth Disease, that could threaten our nation’s cattle and livestock industries. That is why it remains prohibited to import unpermitted meat products from continents that have experienced animal disease.''
HERE we go again, so soon they forget, i can't stress enough, and i have in the passed, about just this topic, what i call,
''agriculture suitcase bombs'' from passenger air travel. Nice Catch though CBP DHS et al.
please let me explain why this is so critical.
FIRST of all, Nigeria and Cameroon, are just a hop, skip, and jump, away from Algeria and Tunisia, which has a LARGE OUTBREAK OF A NEW PRION DISEASE IN A NEW LIVESTOCK SPECIES, THE CAMEL, CAMEL PRION DISASE. WE also know, Africa has no clue of TSE prion disease in man or animal. just saying...
Tuesday, April 27, 2021
Working Document on Camel Prion Disease (CPrD) 14/09/2020
Secondly, i wrote about this threat factor for the BSE TSE Prion disease way back;
Community comment
This questions can be very difficult to answer as to find information about "feedstuffs containing either...". International trade statistics are not very detailed and have not separated feedstuff containing MBM from feedstuff not containing MBM. Further it is not defined in the statistics which species of animal the feedstuff is intended for...
snip...
> been imported within the last 8 years?
Holy Mad Cow! Now we get back to those damn NSCS (NON SPECIES CODING SYSTEM) used by the FDA/USDA. I have complained about this time and time again;
Subject: Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; [TSS SUBMISSION ON POTENTIAL FOR BSE/TSE & FMD 'SUITCASE BOMBS']
Date: January 27, 2003 at 1:46 pm PST
Subject: Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002;
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:54:57 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: regulations@aphis.usda.gov
Docket No: 02-088-1
Title: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.go
snip...
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2002 08:42:56 -0800
Reply-To: BSE L
Sender: BSE L
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Subject: USA SEALED BORDERS AND THE ''USCS'' (unspecified species coding system) MORE POTENTIAL B.S.eee
snip...
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?
Approximately 185,000 direct flights from Greece arrived to US airports in fiscal year 2000. Also, an unknown number of passengers from Greece arrived via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 584 air passengers from Greece were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these passengers, 14 carried meat (non-pork) items that could potentially transmit pathogens that cause BSE; most passengers carried from one to two kilograms (kg) of meat, although one passenger in November 1999 carried 23 kg of meat in a suitcase. Florida, Massachusetts, and New York were the reported destinations of these passengers. None of the passengers with meat items reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm while in the US.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_greece0701.htm
Greetings list members,
i just cannot accept this;
> 23 kg of meat in a suitcase (suitcase bomb...TSS)
> The data do not provide a species of origin code for these > products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.
what kind of statement is this?
how stupid do they think we are?
it could also very well mean that _all_ of it was ruminant based products !
Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Slovenia?
There were no direct flights from Slovenia to the US in fiscal year 2000.
APHIS-PPQ’s agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring sampled 27 air passengers from Slovenia for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. One of these 27 passengers was carrying two kilograms of a meat item that could potentially harbor pathogens that cause BSE. This passenger arrived to Elizabeth, New York, in June 2000 and declared no intention to visit a farm or ranch in the US.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_slovenia1101.htm
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?
A total of 45,438 passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from the Czech Republic in fiscal year 2000. It is likely that additional passengers originating in the Czech Republic traveled to the US on non-direct flights.
As part of APHIS-PPQ’s Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 238 air passengers from the Czech Republic were inspected for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these, 10, or 4.2%, were found to be carrying a total of 17 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. None of the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_cz0601.htm
What are the US imports of affected animals or animal products from Austria?
Between 1998 and June 2001, US imports from Austria included goat meat, animal feeds, and sausage. The sausage and animals feeds were from unspecified species.
Source: World Trade Atlas
snip...
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Austria?
A total of 168,598 passengers on direct flights from Austria arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Austria arrived in the US via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ’s agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 565 air passengers from Austria were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Ten (10) of these passengers, or 1.7 percent, carried a total of 23 kg meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US.
Source: US Dept. of Transportation; APHIS-PPQ
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_austria1201.htm
Greetings FDA and public,
if you go to the below site, and search all BSE known countries and check out their air traffic illegal meat they have confiscated, and check out the low number checked, compared to actual passenger traffic, would not take too much for some nut to bring in FMD/TSEs into the USA as a 'suitcase bomb'.
[[Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.]]
if they were to have questioned the terrorist that bombed the Twin Towers with jets, if they were to have questioned them at flight school in the USA, i am sure that they would have said they did not intend to visit the Twin Towers as a flying bomb either. what am i thinking, they probably did ask this? stupid me.
[[In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE.]]
more of the USA infamous 'non-species coding system', wonder how many of these species are capable of carrying a TSE?
snip...
A total of 524,401 passengers arrived on direct flights to the U.S. from Israel in fiscal year 2000. This number does not include passengers who arrived in the U.S. from Israel via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_israel0602.htm
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base.
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Japan?
Approximately 6.84 million passengers on 29,826 direct flights from Japan arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Japan arrived in the US via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 801 air passengers from Japan were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these 801 passengers, 10 carried meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE; most passengers carried an average of 1.7 kilograms of meat. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_japan0901.htm
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?
A total of 3.3 million passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from Germany in 1998, although many of these passengers would not have originated in Germany. As part of APHIS-PPQ's Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 8,247 air passengers from Germany were inspected for items of agricultural interest. Of these, 198, or 2.3%, were found to be carrying a total of 304 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. Thirty (30) of the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US. Reported destination states of these 30 passengers were CA, CO, DE, FL, LA, MT, OH, VA, and WY.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_germany1200e.htm
search archives at bottom of page of each BSE Country;
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/iw_archive.htm
more on non-species coding system and TSEs and potential 'suitcase bombs';
To: BSE L
Subject: Re: POLAND FINDS 4TH MAD COW CASE/USA IMPORTS FROM POLAND/non-species coding system strikes again
References:
let me kick a madcow around here a bit.
on the imports from Poland and the infamous USA 'non-species' coding system.
the USDA/APHIS states;
> During the past four years (1998 - 2001), US imports from > Poland included non-species specific animal products > used in animal feeds and non-species specific sausage and offal > products (Table 3). Given US restrictions on ruminant product > imports, these US imports should not have contained ruminant > material.
NOW, if you read Polands GBR risk assessment and opinion on BSE, especially _cross-contamination_, it states;
ANNEX 1
Poland - Summary of the GBR-Assessment, February 2001
EXTERNAL CHALLENGE STABILITY INTERACTION OF EXTERNAL CHALLENGE AND STABILITY
The very high to extremely high external challenge met a very unstable system and could have led to contamination of domestic cattle in Poland from 1987 onwards.
This internal challenge again met the still very unstable system and increased over time.
The continuing very high external challenge supported this development.
Not OK MBM-ban since 1997, but no feed controls. Reasonably OK Heat treatment equivalent to 133°C / 20min / 3 bar standards, but no evidence provided on compliance.
Not OK. No SRM-ban, SRM are rendered and included in cattle feed.
BSE surveillance:
Not sufficient before 2001.
Cross-contamination:
Lines for ruminant and non-ruminant feed in feed-mills only separated in time and no analytical controls carried out. Likely present since 1987 and growing.
see full text and ANNEX 1 at;
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out185_en.pdf
so in my humble opinion, the statement by the USDA/APHIS that ''these US imports _should_ not have contained ruminant materials, is a joke. a sad joke indeed.
* POLAND BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENT
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out185_en.pdf
BSE ISRAEL change in disease status, AND THE DAMN NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM $$$
BSE ISRAEL change in disease status, AND THE DAMN NON-SPECIES ...
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be09.html
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Mar03/031403/96N-0417-EC-2.htm
BSE L
011433
02/06/05 17:23 291 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, Israel $ more of the infamous 'non-species coding system' 011934
02/10/31 14:56 245 POLAND FINDS 4TH MAD COW CASE/USA IMPORTS FROM POLAND/non-species coding system strikes again 011936
02/10/31 17:03 352 Re: POLAND FINDS 4TH MAD COW CASE/USA IMPORTS FROM POLAND/non-species coding system strikes again 011937
02/11/01 10:11 619 BSE ISRAEL change of status (MORE USA IMPORTS OF NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM) $ JAPAN BSE UPDATE $ FALLEN STOCK
TSS
########### http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ############
in my opinion, CWD is a small part of a much larger problem here in the USA in speaking of human/animal TSEs. I believe a TSE has existed in the USA cattle herds for many years (decades), they simply have refused to test to find . I believe the Federal Government is using CWD to scare the hell out of everyone and to get everyone's attention away from any thoughts of a TSE aka mad cow in USA cattle, which is where the attention was before CWD came to play, when they knew it had been here for decades. with an agent where the incubation period can be up to 50 years and a Government that refuses to make CJD reportable Nationally and refuses to test to find in USA cattle (all phenotypes), I am afraid I will never know what I seek to find out. About the numbers you speak of, yes, it is a rare disease for now, but again, what about 50 years down the road, and again, what if, forgetting for a moment about misdiagnosis of CJD with Alzheimer's, but what if Alzheimer's turns out to be a TSE (totally hypothetical for now), but something one must ponder from science to date, again my opinion. you are very much likely for now to get run over by a car, than to even witness a death from CJD (I have had both happen). I simply do this to tell the public the 'rest of the story'. you can take it with how ever many grains of salt you wish...
kind regards, Terry
=====
Owens, Julie
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM
To: FSIS Regulations Comments
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98 8/3/2006 Greetings FSIS,
I would kindly like to comment on the following ;
[Federal Register: July 12, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 133)] [Notices] [Page 39282-39283] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr12jy06-35]
snip...
4. WHAT does USDA/FDA ET AL intend to do about the risks of atypical BSE/TSE in cattle now that infectivity shows in tissue samples other than CNS in Japan, the fact now that the last Texas mad cow and that last mad cow in Alabama were indeed of the atypical strain, the fact that the studies long ago in Mission, Texas of USA sheep scrapie transmission to the USA bovine, which proved an 'atypical tse' in the USA bovine, the fact also that USDA/FDA are still floundering on the last SRM regulations, but with the BASE strain now in cattle that is not similar to nvCJD, but very similar to the sporadic CJD, and sporadic CJD has tripled in the last few years in the USA. WHAT do you plan to do to protect human health from these atypical strains of TSE, in relations to SRMs ?
5. THE 2004 Enhanced BSE surveillance program, that tested all those cows, but then we found just how terribly flawed the program was, from testing protocols, to testing the most likely to have BSE i.e. high risk, to the geographical distribution of the testing and high risk areas, to letting the tissue samples of one mad cow sit on a shelf for 7+ months and then having to have an act of Congress to ever get that cow finally confirmed, to that other Texas mad cow they decided to not even bother testing at all, just rendered that very suspect cow, to suspect to test evidently, back to that Alabama mad cow that they could only give a guess as to age with dentition where we all know that the age of that cow was so close to 10 years it could have been 9 years 7 months to 10 years 3 months, thus possibly being an BAPB i.e. USA 'born after partial ban', to all those rabies suspect cows that did not have rabies, and DID NOT get tested for BSE/TSE in that June 2004 enhanced surveillance program, even though the common lay person knows the suspect rabies negative cows are suppose to be BSE/TSE tested, how does one correct all these blatant failures and will they be corrected?
IT never was about human/animal health, but all about commodities and futures. ... MISSION ACCOMPLISHED $$$ ENFAMOUS NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM BY FDA ET AL, another handy tool for importing/exporting all strains of TSE ;
Docket Management
Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food Facilities, Section 305
Comment Number: EC -254
Accepted - Volume 11
Page 94 of 98
8/3/2006
http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/DOCKETS/02n0276/02N-0276-EC-254.htm
ONE FINAL THOUGHT ;
OPINION
>>>New methodology, under the auspices of the OIE, is under construction within the EU and EFSA and the Panel recommended that once these classifications had been finalized they should harmonized with those used in the EFSA BSE QRA guidance document. The Panel anticipated that this harmonization may have a knock-on impact on the QRA calculations, conclusions and recommendations and that, again, future Panel members should review this, and other, inputs of the QRA and address this impact using their “self-tasking mandate” option.<<<
GOD HELP US!
sample survey via oie for bse is about 400 test via 100 million cattle, if i am not mistaken. MOST countries that went by these OIE guidelines all eventually went down with BSE. ...TSS
THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...
Page 95 of 98
8/3/2006
snip...see full comment submission;
Owens, Julie From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net] Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM To: FSIS RegulationsComments Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98 8/3/2006 Greetings FSIS,
I would kindly like to comment on the following ;
[Federal Register: July 12, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 133)] [Notices] [Page 39282-39283] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr12jy06-35]
OIE, DEFRA, FSA, BSE Report Somerset England
Subject: DEFRA FSA Single case of classical BSE confirmed on a farm in Somerset
OIE Report Somerset England BSE case
September 17, 2021
DEFRA FSA Single case of classical BSE confirmed on a farm in Somerset
EU Feed ban Commission authorises use of certain animal proteins, risk another mad cow type outbreak
Sunday, January 10, 2021
APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Singeltary Submission June 17, 2019
APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Singeltary Submission
Greetings APHIS et al,
I would kindly like to comment on APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087], and my comments are as follows, with the latest peer review and transmission studies as references of evidence.
THE OIE/USDA BSE Minimal Risk Region MRR is nothing more than free pass to import and export the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion disease. December 2003, when the USDA et al lost it's supposedly 'GOLD CARD' ie BSE FREE STATUS (that was based on nothing more than not looking and not finding BSE), once the USA lost it's gold card BSE Free status, the USDA OIE et al worked hard and fast to change the BSE Geographical Risk Statuses i.e. the BSE GBR's, and replaced it with the BSE MRR policy, the legal tool to trade mad cow type disease TSE Prion Globally. The USA is doing just what the UK did, when they shipped mad cow disease around the world, except with the BSE MRR policy, it's now legal.
Also, the whole concept of the BSE MRR policy is based on a false pretense, that atypical BSE is not transmissible, and that only typical c-BSE is transmissible via feed. This notion that atypical BSE TSE Prion is an old age cow disease that is not infectious is absolutely false, there is NO science to show this, and on the contrary, we now know that atypical BSE will transmit by ORAL ROUTES, but even much more concerning now, recent science has shown that Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion in deer and elk which is rampant with no stopping is sight in the USA, and Scrapie TSE Prion in sheep and goat, will transmit to PIGS by oral routes, this is our worst nightmare, showing even more risk factors for the USA FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban.
The FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban has failed terribly bad, and is still failing, since August 1997. there is tonnage and tonnage of banned potential mad cow feed that went into commerce, and still is, with one decade, 10 YEARS, post August 1997 FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban, 2007, with 10,000,000 POUNDS, with REASON, Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. you can see all these feed ban warning letters and tonnage of mad cow feed in commerce, year after year, that is not accessible on the internet anymore like it use to be, you can see history of the FDA failure August 1997 FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban here, but remember this, we have a new outbreak of TSE Prion disease in a new livestock species, the camel, and this too is very worrisome.
WITH the OIE and the USDA et al weakening the global TSE prion surveillance, by not classifying the atypical Scrapie as TSE Prion disease, and the notion that they want to do the same thing with typical scrapie and atypical BSE, it's just not scientific.
WE MUST abolish the BSE MRR policy, go back to the BSE GBR risk assessments by country, and enhance them to include all strains of TSE Prion disease in all species. With Chronic Wasting CWD TSE Prion disease spreading in Europe, now including, Norway, Finland, Sweden, also in Korea, Canada and the USA, and the TSE Prion in Camels, the fact the the USA is feeding potentially CWD, Scrapie, BSE, typical and atypical, to other animals, and shipping both this feed and or live animals or even grains around the globe, potentially exposed or infected with the TSE Prion. this APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087], under it's present definition, does NOT show the true risk of the TSE Prion in any country. as i said, it's nothing more than a legal tool to trade the TSE Prion around the globe, nothing but ink on paper.
AS long as the BSE MRR policy stays in effect, TSE Prion disease will continued to be bought and sold as food for both humans and animals around the globe, and the future ramifications from friendly fire there from, i.e. iatrogenic exposure and transmission there from from all of the above, should not be underestimated. ...
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 07, 2021
Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE OIE, FDA 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS, and Ingestion Therefrom
Brazil Confirms TWO More Cases of Mad Cow Disease BSE States of Mato Grosso and Minas Gerais
Brazil OIE BSE 2 CASES CONFIRMED
the myth that all sporadic/spontaneous BSE TSE Prion disease are not caused by the ingestion of TSE Prion contanimated feed, is just that, a myth, one never proven, and in fact, is not scientific, when;
***> Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.
***> As a result, since atypical BSE can be reasonably considered to pose a potential background level of risk for any country with cattle, the recycling of both classical and atypical strains in the cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.
***> This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route.
***> These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.
Emerg Infect Dis. 2017 Feb; 23(2): 284–287. doi: 10.3201/eid2302.161416 PMCID: PMC5324790 PMID: 28098532
Oral Transmission of L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Agent among Cattle
PrPSc accumulation in the extracerebral tissues may be a result of centrifugal trafficking of the L-BSE prion from the central nervous system along somatic or autonomic nerve fibers rather than centripetal propagation of the agent (4,6,9).
Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.
Our study clearly confirms, experimentally, the potential risk for interspecies oral transmission of the agent of L-BSE. In our model, this risk appears higher than that for the agent of classical BSE, which could only be transmitted to mouse lemurs after a first passage in macaques (14). We report oral transmission of the L-BSE agent in young and adult primates. Transmission by the IC route has also been reported in young macaques (6,7). A previous study of L-BSE in transgenic mice expressing human PrP suggested an absence of any transmission barrier between cattle and humans for this particular strain of the agent of BSE, in contrast to findings for the agent of classical BSE (9). Thus, it is imperative to maintain measures that prevent the entry of tissues from cattle possibly infected with the agent of L-BSE into the food chain.
Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Location: Virus and Prion Research
Title: The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge
Author item Greenlee, Justin item MOORE, S - Orise Fellow item WEST-GREENLEE, M - Iowa State University
Submitted to: Prion
Publication Type: Abstract Only
Publication Acceptance Date: 5/14/2018
Publication Date: 5/22/2018
Citation: Greenlee, J.J., Moore, S.J., West Greenlee, M.H. 2018. The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge. Prion 2018, May 22-25, 2018, Santiago de Compostela, Spain. Paper No. P98, page 116. Interpretive Summary:
This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route.
These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.
P98 The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge
Greenlee JJ (1), Moore SJ (1), and West Greenlee MH (2) (1) United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center, Virus and Prion Research Unit, Ames, IA, United States (2) Department of Biomedical Sciences, Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames, IA, United States.
With the experiment currently at 55 months post-inoculation, no other cattle in this study have developed clinical signs suggestive of prion disease. This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route.
These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.
PRION 2018 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT
Emerg Infect Dis. 2017 Feb; 23(2): 284–287. doi: 10.3201/eid2302.161416 PMCID: PMC5324790 PMID: 28098532
Oral Transmission of L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Agent among Cattle
PrPSc accumulation in the extracerebral tissues may be a result of centrifugal trafficking of the L-BSE prion from the central nervous system along somatic or autonomic nerve fibers rather than centripetal propagation of the agent (4,6,9).
Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.
Our study clearly confirms, experimentally, the potential risk for interspecies oral transmission of the agent of L-BSE. In our model, this risk appears higher than that for the agent of classical BSE, which could only be transmitted to mouse lemurs after a first passage in macaques (14). We report oral transmission of the L-BSE agent in young and adult primates. Transmission by the IC route has also been reported in young macaques (6,7). A previous study of L-BSE in transgenic mice expressing human PrP suggested an absence of any transmission barrier between cattle and humans for this particular strain of the agent of BSE, in contrast to findings for the agent of classical BSE (9). Thus, it is imperative to maintain measures that prevent the entry of tissues from cattle possibly infected with the agent of L-BSE into the food chain.
Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Location: Virus and Prion Research
Title: The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge
Author item Greenlee, Justin item MOORE, S - Orise Fellow item WEST-GREENLEE, M - Iowa State University
Submitted to: Prion
Publication Type: Abstract Only
Publication Acceptance Date: 5/14/2018
Publication Date: 5/22/2018
Citation: Greenlee, J.J., Moore, S.J., West Greenlee, M.H. 2018. The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge. Prion 2018, May 22-25, 2018, Santiago de Compostela, Spain. Paper No. P98, page 116. Interpretive Summary:
This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route.
These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.
P98 The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge
Greenlee JJ (1), Moore SJ (1), and West Greenlee MH (2) (1) United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center, Virus and Prion Research Unit, Ames, IA, United States (2) Department of Biomedical Sciences, Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames, IA, United States.
With the experiment currently at 55 months post-inoculation, no other cattle in this study have developed clinical signs suggestive of prion disease. This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route.
These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.
SOURCE PRION 2018 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT
Dr. Monique Eloit Director General Ma'am, I implore, for the sake of sound science and human and animal health, to finally DO AWAY WITH THE BSE MRR policy, and go back and enhance the BSE GBR risk assessments, enhancing that to include ALL TSE PRION DISEASE, for the following reasons...
REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES Paris, 9–13 September 2019 BSE, TSE, PRION
SNIP...
A meeting of the OIE Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases (the Commission) was held at OIE Headquarters in Paris, France, from 9 to 13 September 2019.
SNIP...
Annex 7 (contd) AHG on BSE risk assessment and surveillance/March 2019
34 Scientific Commission/September 2019
3. Atypical BSE
The Group discussed and endorsed with minor revisions an overview of relevant literature on the risk of atypical BSE being recycled in a cattle population and its zoonotic potential that had been prepared ahead of the meeting by one expert from the Group. This overview is provided as Appendix IV and its main conclusions are outlined below. With regard to the risk of recycling of atypical BSE, recently published research confirmed that the L-type BSE prion (a type of atypical BSE prion) may be orally transmitted to calves1 . In light of this evidence, and the likelihood that atypical BSE could arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence, the Group was of the opinion that it would be reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle were to be exposed to contaminated feed. Therefore, the recycling of atypical strains in cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.
The Group acknowledged the challenges in demonstrating the zoonotic transmission of atypical strains of BSE in natural exposure scenarios. Overall, the Group was of the opinion that, at this stage, it would be premature to reach a conclusion other than that atypical BSE poses a potential zoonotic risk that may be different between atypical strains.
4. Definitions of meat-and-bone meal (MBM) and greaves
snip...
REFERENCES
SNIP...END SEE FULL TEXT;
3. Atypical BSE
The Group discussed and endorsed with minor revisions an overview of relevant literature on the risk of atypical BSE being recycled in a cattle population and its zoonotic potential that had been prepared ahead of the meeting by one expert from the Group. This overview is provided as Appendix IV and its main conclusions are outlined below.
With regard to the risk of recycling of atypical BSE, recently published research confirmed that the L-type BSE prion (a type of atypical BSE prion) may be orally transmitted to calves1 . In light of this evidence, and the likelihood that atypical BSE could arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence, the Group was of the opinion that it would be reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle were to be exposed to contaminated feed. Therefore, the recycling of atypical strains in cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.
The Group acknowledged the challenges in demonstrating the zoonotic transmission of atypical strains of BSE in natural exposure scenarios. Overall, the Group was of the opinion that, at this stage, it would be premature to reach a conclusion other than that atypical BSE poses a potential zoonotic risk that may be different between atypical strains.
snip...
In contrast, there have not been any substantiated reports of the successful oral transmission of H-BSE in cattle. Initial reports from Dudas et al., 2014 based on RT-QuIC pointed to the possibility of oral transmission following a very high dose (100 grams of brain material), although the individual did not display clinical signs and the findings from standard molecular or immunohistochemical assays were all negative. Investigations are ongoing in an attempt to clarify these findings.
Although significant uncertainty remains regarding the origin of C-BSE, several studies involving the serial passage of H-BSE and L-BSE in transgenic and wild-type mice have revealed their potential to lead to the emergence of a C-BSE-like phenotype (Baron et al., 2011; Torres et al., 2011; Bencsik et al., 2013) or other novel strains (Masujin et al., 2016). Whether or not one or both of these atypical strains led to the emergence of C-BSE remains speculative; however, the similarities between transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME), first reported in the USA in 1947 (Hartsough and Burger, 1965), and L-BSE indicate that TME may have been a surrogate indicator for the presence of L-BSE in cattle populations in those countries such as the USA, Canada, Germany, Finland and Russia where outbreaks of TME had been reported decades before C-BSE was first recognised in the United Kingdom in 1986 (Hadlow and Karstad, 1968; Marsh et al., 1991; McKenzie et al., 1996; Baron et al., 2007; Comoy et al., 2013). Although TME was originally thought to have occurred as a result of feeding mink with scrapie infected sheep carcases, oral challenge studies did not confirm this (Marsh et al., 1991). Importantly, in an outbreak reported in the USA in 1985, mink had never been fed sheep products; instead they had been fed on products derived from dead and sick dairy cattle (March et al., 1991). Similarly, from an outbreak in Canada in 1963, mink had reportedly been fed with products derived from cattle but not sheep (Hadlow and Karstad, 1968).
Although, as discussed above, the passage of H-BSE or L-BSE has been proposed as a possible explanation for the origin of C-BSE, transformation of L-BSE or H-BSE to C-BSE has not been observed so far in transmission studies in cattle. That being said, it is likely that, compared to various rodent models, an insufficient number of passages have been undertaken.
It is worth noting that sheep and goats are susceptible to L-BSE following intracerebral inoculation without lymphoid involvement in most individuals (Simmons et al., 2016; Gielbert et al., 2018; Vallino-Costassa et al., 2018). As discussed by Houston and Andreoletti (2018), C-BSE appears to increase in virulence for humans if it is first passaged in sheep. Whether or not this is the same for atypical strains remains to be determined.
Conclusions on transmissibility of atypical BSE among cattle
Given that cattle have been successfully infected by the oral route, at least for L-BSE, it is reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle are exposed to contaminated feed. In addition, based on reports of atypical BSE from several countries that have not had C-BSE, it appears likely that atypical BSE would arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence in old cattle. In the presence of livestock industry practices that would allow it to be recycled in the cattle feed chain, it is likely that some level of exposure and transmission may occur. As a result, since atypical BSE can be reasonably considered to pose a potential background level of risk for any country with cattle, the recycling of both classical and atypical strains in the cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.
***> PLEASE SEE MY correspondence with OIE over the decades (at the bottom of this report see that history) about the BSE GBR vs MRR and CWD zoonosis and reporting on CWD for the past 2 plus decades, and still nothing about CWD TSE Prion in the above report, so sad...tss
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2020
REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES Paris, 9–13 September 2019 BSE, TSE, PRION
MONDAY, JULY 27, 2020
BSE Inquiry DFA's a review
Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES Location: Virus and Prion Research
Title: Disease-associated prion protein detected in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged with the agent of chronic wasting disease
Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.
Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Location: Virus and Prion Research
Title: The agent of chronic wasting disease from pigs is infectious in transgenic mice expressing human PRNP
Author item MOORE, S - Orise Fellow item Kokemuller, Robyn item WEST-GREENLEE, M - Iowa State University item BALKEMA-BUSCHMANN, ANNE - Friedrich-Loeffler-institut item GROSCHUP, MARTIN - Friedrich-Loeffler-institut item Greenlee, Justin Submitted to: Prion Publication Type: Abstract Only Publication Acceptance Date: 5/10/2018 Publication Date: 5/22/2018 Citation: Moore, S.J., Kokemuller, R.D., West-Greenlee, M.H., Balkema-Buschmann, A., Groschup, M.H., Greenlee, J.J. 2018. The agent of chronic wasting disease from pigs is infectious in transgenic mice expressing human PRNP. Prion 2018, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, May 22-25, 2018. Paper No. WA15, page 44.
Interpretive Summary:
The successful transmission of pig-passaged CWD to Tg40 mice reported here suggests that passage of the CWD agent through pigs results in a change of the transmission characteristics which reduces the transmission barrier of Tg40 mice to the CWD agent. If this biological behavior is recapitulated in the original host species, passage of the CWD agent through pigs could potentially lead to increased pathogenicity of the CWD agent in humans.
cwd scrapie pigs oral routes
***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <***
>*** Although the current U.S. feed ban is based on keeping tissues from TSE infected cattle from contaminating animal feed, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from scrapie infected sheep and goats. These results indicating the susceptibility of pigs to sheep scrapie, coupled with the limitations of the current feed ban, indicates that a revision of the feed ban may be necessary to protect swine production and potentially human health. <***
***> Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 month group was positive by EIA. PrPSc was detected by QuIC in at least one of the lymphoid tissues examined in 5/6 pigs in the intracranial <6 months group, 6/7 intracranial >6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 months group, and 4/6 oral >6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%).
***> Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.
Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.
CONFIDENTIAL
EXPERIMENTAL PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
LINE TO TAKE
3. If questions on pharmaceuticals are raised at the Press conference, the suggested line to take is as follows:-
"There are no medicinal products licensed for use on the market which make use of UK-derived porcine tissues with which any hypothetical “high risk" ‘might be associated. The results of the recent experimental work at the CSM will be carefully examined by the CSM‘s Working Group on spongiform encephalopathy at its next meeting.
DO Hagger RM 1533 MT Ext 3201
While this clearly is a cause for concern we should not jump to the conclusion that this means that pigs will necessarily be infected by bone and meat meal fed by the oral route as is the case with cattle. ...
we cannot rule out the possibility that unrecognised subclinical spongiform encephalopathy could be present in British pigs though there is no evidence for this: only with parenteral/implantable pharmaceuticals/devices is the theoretical risk to humans of sufficient concern to consider any action.
May I, at the outset, reiterate that we should avoid dissemination of papers relating to this experimental finding to prevent premature release of the information. ...
3. It is particularly important that this information is not passed outside the Department, until Ministers have decided how they wish it to be handled. ...
But it would be easier for us if pharmaceuticals/devices are not directly mentioned at all. ...
Our records show that while some use is made of porcine materials in medicinal products, the only products which would appear to be in a hypothetically ''higher risk'' area are the adrenocorticotrophic hormone for which the source material comes from outside the United Kingdom, namely America China Sweden France and Germany. The products are manufactured by Ferring and Armour. A further product, ''Zenoderm Corium implant'' manufactured by Ethicon, makes use of porcine skin - which is not considered to be a ''high risk'' tissue, but one of its uses is described in the data sheet as ''in dural replacement''. This product is sourced from the United Kingdom.....
America BSE 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS, BSE SURVEILLANCE, BSE TESTING, and CJD TSE Prion
so far, we have been lucky. to date, with the science at hand, no cwd transmitted to cattle, that has been documented, TO DATE, WITH THE SCIENCE AT HAND, it's not to say it has not already happened, just like with zoonosis of cwd i.e. molecular transmission studies have shown that cwd transmission to humans would look like sporadic cjd, NOT nvCJD or what they call now vCJD. the other thing is virulence and or horizontal transmission. this is very concerning with the recent fact of what seems to be a large outbreak of a new tse prion disease in camels in Africa. there is much concern now with hay, straw, grains, and such, with the cwd tse prion endemic countries USA, Canada. what is of greatest concern is the different strains of cwd, and the virulence there from? this thing (cwd) keeps mutating to different strains, and to different species, the bigger the chance of one of these strains that WILL TRANSMIT TO CATTLE OR HUMANS, and that it is documented (i believe both has already occured imo with scienct to date). with that said, a few things to ponder, and i am still very concerned with, the animal feed. we now know from transmission studies that cwd and scrapie will transmit to pigs by oral routes. the atypical bse strains will transmit by oral routes. i don't mean to keep kicking a mad cow, just look at the science;
***> cattle, pigs, sheep, cwd, tse, prion, oh my!
***> In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006).
Sheep and cattle may be exposed to CWD via common grazing areas with affected deer but so far, appear to be poorly susceptible to mule deer CWD (Sigurdson, 2008). In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006). It is not known how susceptible humans are to CWD but given that the prion can be present in muscle, it is likely that humans have been exposed to the agent via consumption of venison (Sigurdson, 2008). Initial experimental research suggests that human susceptibility to CWD is low and there may be a robust species barrier for CWD transmission to humans (Sigurdson, 2008), however the risk appetite for a public health threat may still find this level unacceptable.
Friday, December 14, 2012
DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012
snip.....
In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law. Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:
1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and
2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.
Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.
The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES.
It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.
Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB.
There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products.
snip.....
36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011). The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison. snip..... The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).
snip.....
In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion. snip..... In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible... For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates.
snip.....
Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents.
snip.....
***> READ THIS VERY, VERY, CAREFULLY, AUGUST 1997 MAD COW FEED BAN WAS A SHAM, AS I HAVE STATED SINCE 1997! 3 FAILSAFES THE FDA ET AL PREACHED AS IF IT WERE THE GOSPEL, IN TERMS OF MAD COW BSE DISEASE IN USA, AND WHY IT IS/WAS/NOT A PROBLEM FOR THE USA, and those are;
BSE TESTING (failed terribly and proven to be a sham)
BSE SURVEILLANCE (failed terribly and proven to be a sham)
BSE 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS (another colossal failure, and proven to be a sham)
these are facts folks. trump et al just admitted it with the feed ban.
see;
FDA Reports on VFD Compliance
John Maday
August 30, 2019 09:46 AM VFD-Form 007 (640x427)
Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach. ( John Maday ) Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD) rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach to help feed mills, veterinarians and producers understand and comply with the requirements. Since then, FDA has gradually increased the number of VFD inspections and initiated enforcement actions when necessary. On August 29, FDA released its first report on inspection and compliance activities. The report, titled “Summary Assessment of Veterinary Feed Directive Compliance Activities Conducted in Fiscal Years 2016 – 2018,” is available online.
FDA Reports on VFD Compliance
John Maday
August 30, 2019 09:46 AM VFD-Form 007 (640x427)
Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach. ( John Maday )
Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD) rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach to help feed mills, veterinarians and producers understand and comply with the requirements. Since then, FDA has gradually increased the number of VFD inspections and initiated enforcement actions when necessary.
On August 29, FDA released its first report on inspection and compliance activities. The report, titled “Summary Assessment of Veterinary Feed Directive Compliance Activities Conducted in Fiscal Years 2016 – 2018,” is available online.
Overall, the FDA reports a high level of compliance across the affected livestock-industry sectors.
In fiscal year 2016, FDA began a small, three-part pilot inspection program that began with inspectors visiting feed distributors to review randomly selected VFD documents. The inspectors then selected one VFD at the distributor and conducted further inspections of the veterinarian and producer (client) named on that VFD.
In fiscal years 2017 and 2018, FDA continued those three-part inspections and expanded the program to include state feed regulatory partners. In fiscal year 2017, state personnel inspected VFD distributors and reviewed selected VFDs for compliance with the requirements. In 2018, those state inspectors began conducting three-part inspections, similar to those conducted by the FDA investigators. With state inspectors contributing, the number of VFD inspections increased from 57 in 2016 to 130 in 2017 and 269 during 2018.
Of the 269 inspections during 2018, 230 required no action, 38 indicated voluntary action and just one indicated official enforcement action.
Key findings in the report include:
Distributors (2018)
Distributor had notified FDA of their intent to distribute VFD feeds -- 94.8%
Distributors who distributed a VFD feed that complied with the terms of the VFD -- 91.5%
Distributors who manufacture VFD feed: Drug inventory or production records showed the correct amount of drug was added to the feed for the VFD reviewed -- 96.7%
Distributors who manufacture VFD feed: Labels and formulas matched the VFD reviewed -- 91.0%
Distributor’s VFD feed labels contained the VFD caution statement -- 77.2%
Veterinarians
Veterinarians had an active license in the state where the VFD feed authorized on the VFD order(s) is being fed -- 100%
VFDs included veterinarians’ electronic or written signature -- 98.6%
VFDs included the withdrawal time, special instructions, and/or cautionary statements -- 95.3%
Producers
Client did not feed VFD feed beyond the expiration date on the VFD -- 100%
Client fed VFD feed to the animals authorized on the VFD (number, species, and/or production class) -- 100%
Client fed VFD feed for the duration identified on the VFD -- 100%
Client complied with the special instructions on the VFD -- 100%
FDA issued just one warning letter following inspections during fiscal year 2018, for a feed mill that “adulterated and misbranded VFD feed by distributing VFD feed to other distributors without first receiving an acknowledgment letter, in addition to adulterating and misbranding medicated and non-medicated feed for other reasons.”
In its report, FDA reminds stakeholders that VFD medicated feeds must be used in according to the approved conditions of use and must be under the oversight of a licensed veterinarian and consistent with a lawful VFD order. The agency intends to continue monitoring compliance, and to provide education, but FDA will also use enforcement strategies when voluntary compliance with the VFD final rule requirements is not achieved.
See the full summary report from FDA.
For more on the VFD rules and compliance, see these articles from BovineVetOnline.com.
VFD Audits: What to Expect
VFD Audits: Start with the Feed Distributor
FDA Draft Guidance Updates VFD Q&A
SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2019
***> FDA Reports on VFD Compliance
TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 2017
***> EXTREME USA FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED LOOP HOLE STILL EXIST, AND PRICE OF POKER GOES UP ***
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2019
Veterinary Biologics Guideline 3.32E: Guideline for minimising the risk of introducing transmissible spongiform encephalopathy prions and other infectious agents through veterinary biologics
U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001
Subject: BSE--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2001 16:49:00 -0800
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
snip...
[host Richard Barns] and now a question from Terry S. Singeltary of CJD Watch.
[TSS] yes, thank you, U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?
[no answer, you could hear in the back ground, mumbling and 'we can't. have him ask the question again.]
[host Richard] could you repeat the question?
[TSS] U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?
[not sure whom ask this] what group are you with?
[TSS] CJD Watch, my Mom died from hvCJD and we are tracking CJD world-wide.
[not sure who is speaking] could you please disconnect Mr. Singeltary
[TSS] you are not going to answer my question?
[not sure whom speaking] NO
snip...see full archive and more of this;
3.2.1.2 Non‐cervid domestic species
The remarkably high rate of natural CWD transmission in the ongoing NA epidemics raises the question of the risk to livestock grazing on CWD‐contaminated shared rangeland and subsequently developing a novel CWD‐related prion disease. This issue has been investigated by transmitting CWD via experimental challenge to cattle, sheep and pigs and to tg mouse lines expressing the relevant species PrP.
For cattle challenged with CWD, PrPSc was detected in approximately 40% of intracerebrally inoculated animals (Hamir et al., 2005, 2006a, 2007). Tg mice expressing bovine PrP have also been challenged with CWD and while published studies have negative outcomes (Tamguney et al., 2009b), unpublished data provided for the purposes of this Opinion indicate that some transmission of individual isolates to bovinised mice is possible (Table 1).
In small ruminant recipients, a low rate of transmission was reported between 35 and 72 months post‐infection (mpi) in ARQ/ARQ and ARQ/VRQ sheep intracerebrally challenged with mule deer CWD (Hamir et al., 2006b), while two out of two ARQ/ARQ sheep intracerebrally inoculated with elk CWD developed clinical disease after 28 mpi (Madsen‐Bouterse et al., 2016). However, tg mice expressing ARQ sheep PrP were resistant (Tamguney et al., 2006) and tg mice expressing the VRQ PrP allele were poorly susceptible to clinical disease (Beringue et al., 2012; Madsen‐Bouterse et al., 2016). In contrast, tg mice expressing VRQ sheep PrP challenged with CWD have resulted in highly efficient, life‐long asymptomatic replication of these prions in the spleen tissue (Beringue et al., 2012).
A recent study investigated the potential for swine to serve as hosts of the CWD agent(s) by intracerebral or oral challenge of crossbred piglets (Moore et al., 2016b, 2017). Pigs sacrificed at 6 mpi, approximately the age at which pigs reach market weight, were clinically healthy and negative by diagnostic tests, although low‐level CWD agent replication could be detected in the CNS by bioassay in tg cervinised mice. Among pigs that were incubated for up to 73 mpi, some gave diagnostic evidence of CWD replication in the brain between 42 and 72 mpi. Importantly, this was observed also in one orally challenged pig at 64 mpi and the presence of low‐level CWD replication was confirmed by mouse bioassay. The authors of this study argued that pigs can support low‐level amplification of CWD prions, although the species barrier to CWD infection is relatively high and that the detection of infectivity in orally inoculated pigs with a mouse bioassay raises the possibility that naturally exposed pigs could act as a reservoir of CWD infectivity.
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
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